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THE LIMITED REACH OF DELCOSTELLO V. INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS: A STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS IN LMRDA
TITLE I ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION

In 1959, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA")' to regulate internal union affairs. In response
to reported abuses of power by union leadership,2 Congress placed power
in the hands of union members,3 thus ensuring internal union
democracy.
The goal of promoting union democracy could not be fully achieved
unless the LMRDA left union members free to discuss union practices
1. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401531 (1982 & Supp. II 1985)). The passage of such regulatory legislation became inevitable when Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), ch. 372, 49
Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)), which, by granting unions the power to act as exclusive collective bargaining representatives, deprives
employees of the right to negotiate terms of employment individually with their employers. By granting such power, Congress assumed the obligation of preventing abuse of
that power. See S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959), reprinted in I NLRB,
Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, at
416 (1985) [hereinafter NLRB]; Cox, InternalAffairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor
Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 819-20 (1960); see also 105 Cong. Rec. 6472
(1959), reprintedin 2 NLRB, supra, at 1098 (statement of Sen. McClellan) (the justification for unionization and collective bargaining "becomes meaningless when the individual worker is just as helpless within his union as he was within his industry, when the
tyranny of the all-powerful corporate employer is replaced by the tyranny of the allpowerful labor boss").
2. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435 (1982). The hearings of the Select Committee
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, commonly known as the McClellan Committee, provided the impetus for the legislation. See Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel &
Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 497 (1968). The McClellan Committee
uncovered evidence of misappropriation of union funds and of denial of basic rights of
union members. See Interim Report of the Select Committee on Improper Activities in
the Labor or Management Field, S. Rep. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1958); see
also Wirtz, 391 U.S. at 497; 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1959), reprintedin 1 NLRB, supra note 1, at 764; Cox, supra note I, at 820.
Entrenched, corrupt leaders controlled some unions and maintained power through violence, intimidation, and other autocratic practices. See United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 122 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); see also Sadlowski v. United
Steelworkers, 645 F.2d 1114, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing corruption in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International
Union of America, United Textile Workers of America, and the International Union of
Operating Engineers), rev'd, United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
Fear was such that "a rank and file member dare[d] not risk any opposition to a corrupt
or autocratic leadership." 105 Cong. Rec. 6472 (1959), reprintedin 2 NLRB, supra note
1, at 1098 (statement of Sen. McClellan).
3. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6472 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 1. at 1099
(statement of Sen. McClellan).
4. See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 441 (1982); Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club
Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 497 (1968); S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1959), reprintedin 1 NLRB, supra note 1, at 416.
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openly and to criticize union leaders without fear of sanctions.5 Therefore, Congress included Title I of the LMRDA 6 to provide a statutory
"bill of rights" 7 for union members, according them guarantees such as
equal rights and privileges,8 freedom of speech and assembly, 9 and protection from discipline without due process. 10
The LMRDA does not contain a statute of limitations applicable to
actions brought for violations of Title I. Generally, when federal statutes do not provide limitations periods,12 the rule is to borrow an appropriate statute of limitations from state law.' 3 In DelCostello v.
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, 4 the Supreme Court departed
from the traditional borrowing rule by applying the limitations period

found in section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")15
to a Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA") section 301/duty of

fair representation ("hybrid") claim.' 6 The federal courts of appeals are
divided whether to extend the DelCostello holding to cover a union member's LMRDA Title I claims against his union. 7
Part I of this Note discusses the traditional practice of borrowing state
5. See United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 112 (1982); Finnegan v. Leu,
456 U.S. 431, 435-36 (1982).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1982).
7. Id. (Title I is entitled "Bill of Rights Of Members of Labor Organizations").
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1).
9. See id.§ 411(a)(2).
10. See id.§ 41 l(a)(5) (requiring notice and a hearing before imposition of discipline).
11. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 976 (2d Cir.
1987); Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers, 748 F.2d 180, 182
(3d Cir. 1984). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1982).
12. Federal statutes frequently do not contain a statute of limitations. See, e.g.,
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983) (29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1982)); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980) (42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
13. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985) (Civil Rights Act of 1871); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966) (LMRA § 301); O'Sullivan
v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914) (Civil Rights Act of 1870); Chattanooga Foundry &
Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906) (Sherman Act); Campbell v.
Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1895) (Patent Act).
14. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). This limitations period governs charges of unfair labor
practices as defined in § 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
16. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 154-55; see also infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text
(definition and discussion of hybrid actions).
17. The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits hold that courts should extend the DelCostello holding by applying the section 10(b)
NLRA statute of limitations to LMRDA Title I actions. See Reed v. United Transp.
Union, 828 F.2d 1066, 1067 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S. Mar.
8, 1988) (No. 87-1031); Adkins v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, 769 F.2d 330, 335 (6th Cir. 1985); Davis v. UAW, 765 F.2d 1510, 1514-15 (11 th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); Vallone v. Local Union 705, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 755 F.2d 520, 521-22 (7th Cir. 1984); Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers
v. United Steelworkers, 748 F.2d 180, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1984). The Courts of Appeals for
the First and Second Circuits hold that DelCostello should not be extended to Title I
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limitations periods and the circumstances under which the Court has departed from it. Part II examines the particular application of borrowing
principles in DelCostello. Part III analyzes whether the Court's reasons
for turning to federal law in DelCostello are equally valid in the context
of an LMRDA Title I claim and finds that they are not. This Note concludes that the concerns underlying civil rights claims closely resemble
the concerns addressed by the Title I cause of action and, therefore,
courts should apply state limitations periods applicable to civil rights
claims to Title I suits.
I.

BORROWING LIMITATIONS PERIODS

When federal statutes lack limitations periods, the settled practice is to
infer that Congress intended the courts to apply the most closely analogous state law statute of limitations.II The prevailing view holds that the
practice of borrowing state limitations periods relies on a presumption
that Congress' awareness of the long and consistent judicial practice of
borrowing state law indicates that Congress, when silent, intends application of state statutes. 9 The fact that Congress has amended statutes to
claims. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 977 (2d Cir.
1987); Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 11 (st Cir. 1986).
In Doty, the court reaffirmed its prior decision in Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st
Cir. 1984), where the court applied the six-month § 10(b) NLRA period to a hybrid suit
to which LMRDA claims were appended. Doty, 784 F.2d at 4. The Doty court distinguished that situation from the freestanding LMRDA claim before it. Id. The Linder
court, however, had given little consideration to the LMRDA claim and simply applied
section 10(b). See Linder, 739 F.2d at 690.
18. See supra note 13.
19. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates., 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2771
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 158-59 & nn.12-13 (1983); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) ("The
implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of the federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has not spoken but left
matters for judicial determination within the general framework of familiar legal principles.").
Two other rationales have been offered to justify the practice of applying state statutes
of limitations. One view contends that the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982), requires application of state law when a federal statute is silent on the limitations
issue. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172-73 & n. 1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The second view
posits that the practice of applying state limitations periods involves no "borrowing" at
all; "state statutes appl[y] of their own force, unless pre-empted by federal law." Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2768 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); cf Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895) (Congress intended to subject
federal actions without a limitations provision "to the general laws of the state applicable
to actions of a similar nature"); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 269, 275 (1830) ("a
statute of limitations is the law of the forum, and operates upon all who submit themselves to its jurisdiction"). Under Justice Scalia's view, federal courts can never "borrow" a limitations period from federal law because the practice does not involve
borrowing. Malley-Duff, 107 S.Ct. at 2771 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). If the terms or purposes of the federal statute pre-empt state law, then no limitations period governs the
action. Id
The prevailing view treats the federal statute as the source of the obligation to apply
state law; Congress' silence directs courts to follow their previous borrowing practice. Id.
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provide for limitations periods when it disagrees with this interpretation
of its silence bolsters this presumption.2 °
Because state legislatures do not take federal interests into account
when establishing limitations periods, however, federal courts have an
obligation to ensure that the use of state law will neither frustrate nor
interfere with the implementation of federal policies. 2' Courts, therefore,
should not borrow local statutes of limitations when their application
would conflict with the policies underlying the federal statute. 22 Employing this principle, the Court has sometimes declined to borrow state
statutes.23
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,24 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional rule that courts should adopt
analogous state law unless the state law interferes with federal policy.2 5
The Court, however, modified the rule, stating that courts should turn
away from state law when "federal law clearly provides a closer analogy
than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and
the practicalities of litigation make [federal law] a significantly more ap26
propriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.
With its decision in DelCostello, the Court embarked on a new course

in the history of borrowing. The decision marks the first time the Court
at 2768. Under Justice Scalia's view, the duty to apply state law "does not spring from"
the federal statute. Id. at 2770. Rather, the federal statute is relevant only for the purposes of determining whether the terms or purposes of the statute pre-empt the state
limitations period. Id. Both the majority approach, see DelCostello v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983), and Justice Scalia's view, see Malley-Duff,
107 S. Ct. at 2770 (Scalia, J., concurring), agree that the Rules of Decision Act does not
mandate application of state limitations periods because the Act merely begs the question, authorizing federal courts to use state laws "in cases where they apply." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
20. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 15b (1982) (amending Clayton Act to include limitations period); 35 U.S.C. § 286
(1982) (amending Patent Act to provide statute of limitations).
21. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); see DelCostello v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (1983) ("In some circumstances...
state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal
law.").
22. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 367; see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S.
454, 465 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., 107 S.Ct. 2759, 276566 (1987) (applying Clayton Act statute of limitations to civil RICO claim because of
lack of any satisfactory state law analogy to RICO and need for uniform national limitations period); Occidental,432 U.S. at 368 (applying no limitations period to EEOC Title
VII enforcement suit because application of state period would interfere with congressional intent to delay judicial action while EEOC performs its administrative
responsibilities).
24. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
25. See id. at 158-61.
26. Id. at 171-72. The majority of the Court reaffirmed this modification of the traditional borrowing rule in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., 107 S.Ct. 2759
(1987).
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borrowed a limitations period from another federal statute.2' Previously,
when faced with inconsistent state law analogies, the Court had concluded that no time limit governed the action.2 Furthermore, before it
would turn away from state law, the Court had always required that the
state limitations period be inconsistent with the policies of the federal
statute.29
Although the Court in DelCostello declared that courts should not reject state law anytime it "fails to provide a perfect analogy,"3 0 courts
may apply a federal limitations period if that period is more "appropriate."'" This language implies that courts need not find actual inconsistency with federal policies before turning away from state law.3 2
To determine whether departure from the longstanding borrowing rule
is justified in the LMRDA Title I context, available state law analogies
and section 10(b) of the NLRA 3 must be examined. 4 Such an examination requires an understanding of the Court's reasoning in DelCostello.
27. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2768
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
In DelCostello, the Court relied on McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S.
221 (1958), for the proposition that federal courts may borrow limitations periods from
federal law. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 162 (1983).
In McAllister, however, the Court merely held that a state statute of limitations of less
than three years, applied to a federal unseaworthiness claim, was inconsistent with federal
policy. 357 U.S. at 224-26. The Court left open the possibility that a state period of three
years or more might be appropriate. Id Indeed, the Court expressly declined to decide
what limitations period should govern, but indicated state law or the admiralty doctrine
of laches as the only alternatives. Id at 224. The Court therefore did not even consider
that a federal statute of limitations might apply. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 704 n.6 (1966) (McAllister represents no departure from the tradition of applying state limitations periods to federal causes of action).
28. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
29. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2768
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465
(1975); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1966); see, e.g., Occidental,432 U.S. at 367.
30. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983).
31. Id at 171-72.
32. This modification has "reformulat[ed] the rule, transforming it from a presumption that congressional silence means that [courts] should apply the appropriate state
limitations period into a presumption that ...

[courts] should apply the appropriate

limitations period, state orfederal." Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
107 S. Ct. 2759, 2772 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
33. Section 10(b) is the only federal limitations period that the federal courts of appeals have considered when choosing the appropriate statute of limitations for an
LMRDA Title I action in terms of the DelCostello rule. See cases cited supra note 17.
34. See Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers, 580 F. Supp.
866, 868 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (considering the federal policies at stake, court must "find the
state or federal action most closely analogous to an LMRDA claim"), aff'd, 748 F.2d 180
(3d Cir. 1984); International Union of Elevator Constructors v. Home Elevator Co., 798
F.2d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1986) (despite close state law analogy, if federal policy makes the
federal limitations period significantly more appropriate, court should apply the federal
period).
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DELCOSTELLO V. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS

In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,3" the
Supreme Court applied the six-month limitations period found in section
10(b) of the NLRA 36 to an LMRA section 301/duty of fair representation claim.37 The Court rejected the use of state limitations periods because state statutes neither closely parallel the hybrid action nor serve
the federal policies and the practicalities of litigation involved in the hybrid action.3"
The Court began its analysis by noting that the hybrid action has no
close state law analogy.3 9 A hybrid action combines a union member's
LMRA section 301 claim against his employer for breach of the collec-

tive bargaining agreement' ° with his claim against his union for breach of

its implied duty of fair representation in its handling of the ensuing grievance and arbitration proceeding."a This unusual amalgam,42 a creature
peculiar to federal labor law, arises out of the federal labor policy of exclusive representation.4 3 The practicalities of litigation in a hybrid claim
convinced the Court that state law analogies would prove inadequate to
35. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
37. 462 U.S. at 155. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
38. Id. at 165.
39. Id.
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982) ("Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.").
41. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186-87 (1967). The Supreme Court has held the duty of fair representation to be implicit in the NLRA. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 & n.14 (1983); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964).
The duty exists because the NLRA makes labor unions the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in a bargaining unit. See supra note 1. The reduction in individual
rights resulting from this policy of exclusive representation imposes on the union the duty
"to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to
exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177.
42. The employee's claim against the employer and his claim against the union are
"inextricably interdependent. 'To prevail against either the company or the Union, ....
[employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union.'"
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1981) (quoting Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976)). The employee must prove the same
case whether he sues the employer, the union, or both. See DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983).
43. See Garcia v. Eidal Int'l Corp., 808 F.2d 717, 720 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 94 (1987); Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799
F.2d 1098, 1107 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1291 (1987); Merk v. Jewel Food
Stores Div., 641 F. Supp. 1024, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Papianni v. International Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 11, 622 F. Supp. 1559, 1574
(D.N.J. 1985).
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effectuate the purposes of federal labor law.*' State statutes" could not
satisfy both the federal interest in rapid resolution of labor disputes4 6 and
the desire to provide an employee with a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his rights.47
The Court, however, found a close analogy between the hybrid action
and complaints of unfair labor practices, in terms of both the substantive
rights asserted and the federal labor policies underlying the two actions.48 The Court noted that a substantial overlap exists between the
claims because many fair representation actions include charges of discrimination based on membership status or dissident views, which qualify as unfair labor practices. 4 9
Furthermore, the Court found a close similarity between the federal
policy considerations relevant to the choice of a limitations period for
both hybrid and unfair labor practice claims.5 0 The federal policy reflected by national labor laws seeks to promote stability in industrial relations through use of collective barbaining agreements."' Complete
effectuation of the federal policy occurs when the collective bargaining
agreement contains both a provision for the arbitration of grievances and
an absolute agreement not to strike.5 2 The arbitration agreement is considered the quid pro quo for the agreement prohibiting strikes.5" Federal
labor policy promotes arbitration as a substitute for industrial strife,5
thus furthering the parties' mutual objective of uninterrupted operation
44. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165-68 (1983).
45. The Court considered and rejected state actions to vacate arbitration awards, id.
at 165-66, and state actions for legal malpractice, id. at 167-68, as not sufficiently
analogous.
46. Id. at 168. According to the Court, the relatively long state statutes of limitations
governing malpractice actions-in one state, as long as 10 years, see id. at 168 n.18would interfere with the goal of expeditious resolution of labor disputes. Id. at 168.
47. Id. at 166. Although state limitations on actions to vacate a commercial arbitration award are short enough to fulfill the federal goal of rapid resolution of labor disputes
(most states require filing within 90 days, see id. at 166 n.15), they do not provide an
employee with a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his rights. Id. at 166. Unlike an
action to vacate a commercial arbitration award, the plaintiff in a hybrid action, often
unsophisticated in labor matters, must evaluate the adequacy of the union's representation, retain counsel, and investigate substantial matters that were not at issue in the initial
arbitration. Id.
48. Id at 169-71.
49. Id at 170. The NLRB has consistently held that all breaches of a union's duty of
fair representation qualify as unfair labor practices. Id.; see, eg., Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enf. denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Although the Court
declined to decide the correctness of the Board's position, it did find the "family resemblance" between the claims to be "undeniable." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 170.
50. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 170-71; see also infra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
51. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1957).
52. See United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 578 n.4.
53. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
54. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
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during the term of the agreement.
The arbitral system forms "part of the continuous collective bargaining process.",5 6 A collective bargaining agreement cannot possibly foresee and provide for every problem that may arise.5 7 Accordingly, a
collective bargaining agreement establishes a system of industrial selfgovernment, 58 of which the grievance machinery forms the core.5 9 Arbitration decisions interpret critical terms in the collective bargaining
agreement, 60 giving "meaning and content" to the agreement. 6 I
The central importance of the contractual grievance resolution system
to the objective of promoting stable labor-management relations enhances the federal goal of rapid, final resolution of labor disputes 62 in
suits that implicate the grievance machinery. 63 Allowing arbitration decisions that interpret important terms of the collective bargaining agreement to be called into question years later could render the whole system
of industrial self-government unworkable.' The integrity of the grievance resolution system, therefore, must be protected by according arbitration decisions finality and certainty.6 5
Application of uniform law also constitutes an important federal concern in some labor actions.6 6 The need for uniformity arises when the
possible application of conflicting laws would exert a disruptive influence
on the negotiation of collective agreements 67 and would tend to create
and prolong disputes as to their interpretation.68 In other words, the
need for uniformity is greatest where its absence would jeopardize the
smooth operation of those "consensual processes that federal labor law is

55. See United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582.
56. Id. at 581.
57. See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1498-99

(1959).
58. See United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 580.
59. See id. at 581.
60. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 64 (1981).
61. United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 581.
62. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 63; UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707
(1966).
63. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 168-69 (1983);
Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 63-64; Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 98 (6th Cir.
1982); Papianni v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
Local 11, 622 F. Supp. 1559, 1575 n.10 (D.N.J. 1985).
64. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 64 (1981); see also UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1966) (discussing the federal goal of rapid
resolution of labor disputes); Local Lodge No. 1424, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. NLRB,
362 U.S. 411, 425 (1960) (discussing the importance of 10(b)'s six-month period to stability of bargaining relationships).
65. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); Badon v. General
Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1982).
66. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 162-63 (1983).
67. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) ("the process of negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same
meaning under two or more systems of law").
68. Id. at 103-04.
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chiefly designed to promote-the formation of the collective agreement
and the private settlement of disputes under it."69
The hybrid suits in DelCostello implicated these important federal policy concerns. The suits involved direct challenges to arbitration decisions7 ° that gave meaning and content to the collective bargaining
contracts, 71 raising the concern for protecting the grievance machinery
from delayed attack. 7' Furthermore, application of uniform law constituted an important consideration because the suit directly implicated the
private settlement of disputes under the collective bargaining

agreement.73
The Court in DelCostello applied the six-month limitations period of
section 10(b) of the NLRA because Congress designed that period to
accommodate the same balance of interests that arises in a hybrid action: 74 "the proper balance between the national interests in stable bar-

gaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and an
employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement
under the collective-bargaining system."'75 The limitations period was

designed to strengthen and safeguard
the continuing collective bargain76
ing process from "delayed attack.
III.

APPLICABILITY OF DELCOSTELLO

To LMRDA

TITLE I CLAIMS

The majority of the federal courts of appeals that have addressed the
69. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966).
70. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983).
DelCostello involved two consolidated cases. In each case, the arbitration process had
found the grievance of the employee to be without merit. IL at 155, 157. Each employee
then brought suit seeking to set aside the arbitration decision, claiming that the employer
had breached a provision of the collective bargaining agreement and that the union had
represented him in the arbitration proceeding in a "capricious," "arbitrary," "discriminatory," and "perfunctory" manner. Id at 156, 157.
71. See id at 168-69. In one of the two cases the DelCostello Court had before it, the
employee had been relieved of his duties after he had refused to drive a tractor-trailer
which he believed to be unsafe. Id at 155. The arbitration procedure interpreted the
collective bargaining agreement to determine whether termination of employment in this
way constituted a "voluntary quit[ting]" or a wrongful discharge. Id. at 155 n.3. In the
other case, the arbitration proceeding determined whether the employer's job assignments were permitted under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 157.
72. See icL at 168-69 (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63-64
(1981)).
73. See id at 171.
74. See id at 169.
75. Id at 171 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70 (1981)
(Stewart, J., concurring)). See Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers, 748 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F.2d 1098, 1107 (6th Cir. 1986) (policy behind
DelCostellowas that rapid resolution of labor disputes is desired when the collective bargaining process is threatened), cert denied, 107 S.Ct. 1291 (1987); Rector v. Local Union
No. 10, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 625 F. Supp. 174, 180 (D. Md. 1985)

(same).
76. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 68 (1981) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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issue hold that DelCostello should be extended to LMRDA Title I
claims." These courts purport to find the same collective bargaining
concerns at stake in a Title I action that the hybrid suit in DelCostello
implicated.7 8 Accordingly, they hold the DelCostello Court's reasons for
applying section 10(b) to the hybrid suit equally valid in the Title I context. 79 These courts, however, fail to perceive the important differences
between the interests present in the hybrid suit and those interests sought
to be fostered in an LMRDA Title I action.8 " DelCostello represents an
exception to the general borrowing rule, and a closer examination of the
DelCostello exception demonstrates that an LMRDA Title I action falls
within the general rule, not within the DelCostello exception.
The Court in DelCostello did not create an all-embracing, new statute
of limitations to be applied in all labor actions, or even in the subset
consisting of all LMRA section 301 suits.8 ' The DelCostello Court departed from the traditional borrowing practice in the face of the unusual
77. See supra note 17.
78. These courts speculate that unresolved union disputes may undermine the confidence of union members in their leaders and create dissension within the union, thereby
weakening the union and its bargaining effectiveness. See, e.g., Reed v. United Transp.
Union, 828 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S. Mar.
8, 1988) (No. 87-1031); Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers,
748 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1984). In addition to the policy considerations underlying the
two actions, they also rely on the "family resemblance" between Title I actions and unfair
labor practices. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. These courts reject any
distinction between the intra-union nature of LMRDA Title I disputes and the external
concerns of section 8(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982), see, e.g., Reed, 828 F.2d at
1069 (citing Local Union 1397, 748 F.2d at 183), and view each individual member dispute as having an impact on the federal labor scheme, id.
79. See Reed, 828 F.2d at 1070; Adkins v. International Union of Elec., Radio &
Machine Workers, 769 F.2d 330, 335 (6th Cir. 1985); Vallone v. Local Union No. 705,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 755 F.2d 520, 521-22 (7th Cir. 1984); Local Union 1397, 748
F.2d at 183.
In Davis v. UAW, 765 F.2d 1510 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986),
the court applied section 10(b) to a Title I action. Despite recognizing important policy
distinctions between Title I and hybrid claims, id. at 1514, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit still felt bound to find a "connection between labor peace and an action
based on a union's alleged mistreatment of its members by the denial of statutorily protected rights" because of the DelCostello Court's finding of a strong connection between
labor peace and an action based on a union's duty of fair representation. Id.
The conclusion of the Davis court has met with strong criticism. In fact, another panel
of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has questioned the "soundness" of the
Davis holding. See Hechler v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 942, 945-46
& n.1, 948 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1986) (unable
to understand the Davis court's "precipitate jump" from its "deadly" analysis to its conclusion); Rector v. Local Union No. 10, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 625 F.
Supp. 174, 180-81 (D. Md. 1985) (DelCostello does not support the "broad reading and
sweeping application" given to it by Davis and other courts).
80. See infra notes 101-123 and accompanying text.
81. See Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1986); Carruthers Ready-Mix, Inc. v.
Cement Masons Local Union, 779 F.2d 320, 327 (6th Cir. 1985); Robinson v. Pan American World Airways, 777 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1985); Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Soft
Drink Workers, Local 812, 762 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020
(1985); Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., 641 F. Supp. 1024, 1034 (N.D. I11.1986).
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combination of interests involved in the unique hybrid action. The Court
expressly cautioned that its holding "should not be taken as a departure
from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for federal causes of
action, in labor law or elsewhere." 82 Borrowing limitations periods from
state law "remains the norm."'8 3 Emphasizing this point, the Court expressly reaffirmed its decision"' in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,"5
where, adhering to the traditional borrowing rule, it applied a state limitations period to a straightforward LMRA section 30186 action for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement by an employer.8"
The collective bargaining agreement in Hoosier lacked a provision to
submit disputes to arbitration, 8 and, therefore, the case did not raise the
need to protect from delayed attack arbitration decisions that place into
effect crucial interpretations of the collective bargaining agreement.8 9
Because the case did not implicate the consensual processes with which
federal labor law is primarily concerned,9" the Court rejected application
of a uniform time limitation9 1 and, instead, relied heavily on the close
analogy between the straightforward section 301 claim and an ordinary
state law breach of contract action. 2
Comparison of Hoosier with DelCostello illustrates the importance of a
close state law analogy to the determination of the appropriate statute of
limitations to apply to a federal statute that has no limitations provision.
The proper gauge for determining whether a state limitations period
comports with a federal statute is whether the state and federal legislatures contemplated the same interests in establishing their respective
causes of action.93 The DelCostello holding turns on the duty of fair representation, 94 an element foreign to ordinary state law actions for breach
82. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983) (emphasis added).
83. Id at 171.
84. Id. at 162-63.

85. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
87. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 (1966).
88. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 162 (1983).
89. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
90. See Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 702-03.
91. Id. at 701-02.
92. Id. at 705 n.7. The Court applied Indiana's six-year statute governing contracts
not in writing. Id at 707.
93. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980).
94. See O'Hare v. General Marine Transp., 740 F.2d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. FMC Corp., 724 F.2d 815,
817 (9th Cir. 1984); Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., 641 F. Supp. 1024. 1035 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
The Court in DelCostello borrowed a federal statute "that was arguably applicable by
its own terms." Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2773
n.4 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). The hybrid claim is a combination of section 301 of
the LMRA (breach of the collective bargaining agreement), which has no limitations
provision, and the NLRA (breach of the implied duty of fair representation), which does
have a limitations period (section 10(b)). United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell. 451 U.S.
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of contract 95 or actions to vacate arbitration awards. 96 In contrast, the
claim in Hoosier did not involve any element unique to the federal labor
law scheme.9 7 Thus, the action and the interests underlying it could be
matched closely to a state action,9" making appropriate the borrowing of
the state's limitations period. 9 9
In determining whether section 10(b) of the NLRA should be applied
to LMRDA Title I actions, it must be determined whether those factors
that distinguish DelCostello from Hoosier are relevant in the context of a
Title I action." °°
A.

FederalPolicies Factor

Section 10(b) of the NLRA balances the national interests in stable
bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements against the interests of the individual employee in vindicating his rights)10 ' An
LMRDA Title I action implicates an entirely different balance of
interests.0'
LMRDA Title I claims, at most, have only an attenuated impact on
56, 67 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring). Because the section 301 claim necessarily depends on proving the implied NLRA claim, both are "logically subject to" the six-month
limitations period governing claims under the NLRA. Papianni v. International Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 11, 622 F. Supp. 1559, 1574
(D.N.J. 1985).
95. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983).
96. See id. at 165-66.
97. See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162 (Hoosierinvolved "straightforward" breach
of contract action); Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 65 (Stevart, J., concurring) (same). See generally UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
98. See International Union of Elevator Constructors v. Home Elevator Co., 798 F.2d
222, 226 (7th Cir. 1986); Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., 641 F. Supp. 1024, 1035 (N.D.
I1l. 1986); see also Papianni v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers, Local 11, 622 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (D.N.J. 1985) (in actions to enforce
labor contracts, analogous state statute will always be available because "[c]laims sounding in contract are as old as common law jurisprudence itself").
99. The Court applied the state limitations period for actions on unwritten contracts.
See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1966). Comparison of Hoosier with DelCostello also demonstrates that the need for uniformity is greatest when the
dual consensual processes are threatened. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, when arbitration of collective bargaining agreement disputes is not implicated, the federal goal of rapid resolution of labor disputes loses importance and, therefore, may be satisfied by a time period greatly exceeding the six-month period the
DelCostello Court applied. See supra note 92.
100. For discussion of the DelCostello factors, see supra note 26 and accompanying
text. If these factors are not present, then the rule of Hoosier applies, See International
Union of Elevator Constructors v. Home Elevator Co., 798 F.2d 222, 225-26 (7th Cir.
1986); Plumbers' Pension Fund, Local 130 v. Domas Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 778
F.2d 1266, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1985).
101. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
102. See Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986); Davis v. UAW, 765 F.2d 1510,
1514 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); see also Note, The Controversy
Over What Statute of Limitations Period Should Be Applied to Claims Arising Under the
Labor-ManagementReporting and DisclosureAct of 1959, 4 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 325, 34345 (1987).
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the labor-management relationship. Although the majority of the courts
of appeals examining the issue rely on this impact in finding the DelCostello holding applicable to Title I claims, 10 3 the proper inquiry is whether
the effect on labor-management relations is immediate and direct."°
A Title I claim does not directly implicate stable labor-management
relations and finality of private settlements. An action brought pursuant
to Title I of the LMRDA is brought only against the union."0 5 The dis103. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
104. Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Soft Drink Workers, Local 812, 762 F.2d 228, 231
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985). The majority position emphasizes the indirect, long-term effect of unresolved union disputes on union morale, and the resulting
dissension that undermines the union's effectiveness at the bargaining table. See supra
note 78; see, eg., Reed v. United Transp. Union, 828 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1987)
("Internal union disputes, if allowed to fester, may erode the confidence of union members in their leaders and possibly cause a disaffection with the union, thus weakening the
union and its ability to bargain for its members."), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S.
Mar. 8, 1988) (No. 87-1031).
The impact on which the majority position relies is "certainly not of the direct nature
found controlling in DelCostello." Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817
F.2d 967, 977 (2d Cir. 1987); see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing the
manner in which the action in DelCostello directly challenged the grievance mechanism
that is central to the federal goal of stable labor-management relations); see also Davis v.
UAW, 765 F.2d 1510, 1514 n.11 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (although court applied § 10(b) to Title
I action, it found the link between dissension within the union and stable bargaining
relationships "rather tenuous in the situation of a single dispute between an individual
union member and the union"), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); Rector v. Local
Union No. 10, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 625 F. Supp. 174, 178 (D. Md. 1985)
(because Title I claims cannot, for example, overturn the results of union elections, they
"rarely affect the viability of a union as a bargaining unit"); Testa v. Gallagher, 621 F.
Supp. 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Soft Drink Workers, Local 812, 762 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985)).
In addition, it should be noted that, although it still applied section 10(b) to the
LMRDA claims before it, the Davis court, in fact, readily admitted that major differences
in the policies underlying the hybrid suit and the Title I action existed, and it expressly
found the collective bargaining concerns of DelCostello to be entirely absent in the Title I
context. See Davis, 765 F.2d at 1514; supra note 79.
The rejection by the majority of the courts of appeals of the distinction between the
intra-union nature of Title I disputes and the external concerns of the NLRA does not
properly account for the fact that Congress enacted the LMRDA because it recognized
that "vital non-economic interests of employees were not being adequately protected
under existing legislation." Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 4 (Ist Cir. 1986). Unions not
only further the economic interests of employees, but also offer them the chance to take
part "in decisions that affect the quality of their working lives." Rector, 625 F. Supp. at
178. Title I protects rights of participation, which have a value of their own. Id.
Other courts that have applied section 10(b) to Title I claims only briefly considered
the link between Title I actions and the collective bargaining process and did not provide
much support for their holdings. See, eg., Adkins v. International Union of Elec., Radio
& Machine Workers, 769 F.2d 330, 335 (6th Cir. 1985) (undertaking no analysis of its
own, the court simply cites to Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers, 748 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1984)); Vallone v. Local Union No. 705, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 755 F.2d 520, 521-22 (7th Cir. 1984) (without further explanation, court
states that "the interests balanced by Congress in establishing the statute of limitations in
section 10(b) are the same interests at issue in [a Title I claim]").
105. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 977 (2d Cir.
1987); Davis v. UAW, 765 F.2d 1510, 1514 (1 Ith Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057
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pute is not a collective bargaining dispute, arising in the context of a
labor-management relationship. ° 6 Furthermore, union democracy
claims do not threaten the finality of private settlements under the grievance machinery.'o 7 They do not affect any interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. 0 8 Intra-union disputes therefore have only a tangential effect on the collective bargaining process.' 0 9 Because an
LMRDA Title I dispute does not implicate either of the dual consensual
processes with which federal labor law primarily concerns itself, neither
the need for rapid resolution of the dispute nor the need for application
of uniform law is particularly compelling.
On the other side of the balancing process, the fact that Congress created a specific statute modeled after the Bill of Rights'1 "qualitatively
enhance[s]" the union member's interest in protection from arbitrary actions by his union."' No such specifically identifiable rights exist under
the hybrid claim.I"E The interest of a union member in protecting his
rights rises to a national interest,' 13 however, and therefore commands
greater importance than the interest of a plaintiff in a hybrid action in
setting aside an individual arbitration decision.'I " The importance of
these Title
I rights tilts the balance in favor of a longer limitations
11 5
period.

(1986); Rector v. Local Union No. 10, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 625 F. Supp.
174, 177 (D. Md. 1985); Testa v. Gallagher, 621 F. Supp. 476, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 29
U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
106. See Rodonich, 817 F.2d at 977; Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986);
Testa, 621 F. Supp. at 478-79.
107. Intra-union claims do not seek to overturn arbitration decisions. Such claims
"concern disruption of internal union democracy" and "do not attack the compromise
reached between a union and an employer." Rodonich, 817 F. 2d at 977; accord Dory,
784 F.2d at 7; Rector v. Local Union No. 10, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 625
F. Supp. 174, 177 (D. Md. 1985).
108. See supra note 107.
109. Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 624 F. Supp. 678, 682 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); see Doty, 784 F.2d at 7; Testa v. Gallagher, 621 F. Supp. 476, 479 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); see also supra note 104.
110. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
11. Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986); see Davis v. UAW, 765 F.2d 1510,
1514 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); Rector v. Local Union No. 10,
Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 625 F. Supp. 174, 178 (D. Md. 1985).
112. Doty, 784 F.2d at 7.
113. See Hechler v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 942, 946 (1 Ith Cir.
1987); Doty, 784 F.2d at 7; Davis v. UAW, 765 F.2d 1510, 1514 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
114. See Hechler, 834 F.2d at 946; Davis, 765 F.2d at 1514.
115. See Rector v. Local Union No. 10, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 625 F.
Supp. 174, 178 (D. Md. 1985); Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 624 F.
Supp. 678, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Although prompt resolution of labor disputes is a general concern, what is considered
prompt may differ from one labor dispute to the next. See International Union of Eleva.
tor Constructors v. Home Elevator Co., 798 F.2d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Different
degrees of dispatch are necessary or appropriate in different industrial relations contexts."). Compare UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 (1966) (goal of
rapid resolution satisfied by application of six-year statute of limitations to LMRA sec-
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Closer Analogy Factor

Although it is true that Title I claims display a certain "family resemblance" 1 6 to unfair labor practice claims," 7 the overlap between the
claims bears little consequence.' 8 A focus on the family resemblance
argument addresses only the closer analogy prong of the Supreme
Court's holding in DelCostello. 9 The similarity in policies underlying
both the hybrid action and the congressional choice of the six-month
period holds a place of importance equal to, if not greater than, the closer
analogy prong.' 20 The policies underlying the majority of unfair labor
practice claims differ from those underlying LMRDA Title I claims.' 2 '
Discrimination in a Title I context affects an employee's civil and political rights,122 whereas discrimination alleged in the majority of unfair
labor practice123
claims affects the worker's employment status and his economic rights.

Furthermore, a Title I claim, unlike a hybrid LMRA section 301/duty
of fair representation action, does not defy comparison with state law.
tion 301 claim) with DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155
(1983) (goal satisfied by application of six-month limitations period to hybrid claim).
116. See supra note 49.
117. See Davis v. UAW, 765 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1057 (1986); Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers, 748 F.2d
180, 183 (3d Cir. 1984). The NLRB has recognized that the same union misconduct may
give rise to both an LMRDA Title I claim and an unfair labor practice charge under
§ 8(b)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). See Local Union 1397, 748 F.2d at 183
n.3.
118. See Hechler v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 942, 946 (11 th Cir.
1987); Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 6-7, 10 (Ist Cir. 1986); Rector v. Local Union No. 10,
Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 625 F. Supp. 174, 179 (D. Md. 1985).
119. See Rector, 625 F. Supp. at 178. Several courts that have applied the NLRA
§ 10(b) six-month period to LMRDA claims have emphasized the family resemblance
argument. See McConnell v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 445, 606 F. Supp.
460, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Turco v. Local Lodge 5, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 592 F.
Supp. 1293, 1294 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers v. United
Steelworkers, 580 F. Supp. 866, 868 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 748 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1984).
120. See Rector v. Local Union No. 10, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 625 F.
Supp. 174, 179 (D. Md. 1985); Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 624 F.
Supp. 678, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Testa v. Gallagher, 621 F. Supp. 476, 477 (S.D.N.Y.

1985).

121. See Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 6-7 (Ist Cir. 1986); Rector, 625 F. Supp. at 179;
see also infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
122. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982) (revelations of corruption and disregard of the
rights of individual employees required "legislation that will afford necessary protection
of the rights and interests of employees"); see Doty, 784 F.2d at 4; see. e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 41 l(a)(1) (guaranteeing equal rights and privileges); 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (guaranteeing freedom of speech and assembly); see also infra notes 130-136 and accompanying text.
Internal discrimination includes, for example, "depriving some individuals of the right
to vote on certain union matters, disciplining without due process or in retaliation for
speech, or refusing access to books and records." Doty, 784 F.2d at 7.
123. See Doty, 784 F.2d at 6. See generally R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law:
Unionization and Collective Bargaining 699 (1976) (protection under the NLRA includes
"freedom from unfair, irrelevant or invidious treatment at the hands of the statutory
bargaining representative in matters affecting the employment relationship").
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The breach of the duty of fair representation that makes the hybrid claim
a peculiar amalgam foreign to state law 124 does not complicate the practicalities of litigation of Title I claims. 125 Moreover, application of state
law is unlikely to undermine achievement of any significant goals of federal labor policy because central federal labor concerns are not directly
implicated in an LMRDA Title I action.
There is, therefore, no reason under the DelCostello analysis to depart
from the traditional borrowing rule. Federal law provides neither a
"closer analogy" nor a "significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking" in view of the federal policies at issue and the practicalities of litigation in a Title I action.
C.

The Applicable Statute of Limitations

Having decided that courts should borrow a state statute of limitations, the essential nature of an LMRDA Title I action must be characterized and the most appropriate state statute of limitations must be
selected.12 6 Characterization is the act of classifying a federal cause of
action as a particular type of claim to determine the most appropriate
state statute of limitations to apply. 127 The characterization of a federal
statute for the purpose of borrowing a state limitations period is generally a matter of federal law. 128
Claims asserted under Title I of the LMRDA closely resemble civil
rights violations. 2 9 A Title I action protects an individual union member from deprivation of his civil and political rights by his union. 3 0 Congress, by modeling Title I after the Bill of Rights,1 ' desired to confer on
124. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
125. See Doty, 784 F.2d at 6.
126. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2762
(1987); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985).
127. See Note, Statute of Limitationsin Civil RICO Actions After Wilson v. Garcia, 55
Fordham L. Rev. 529, 533 (1987); see, e.g., Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279-80 (characterizing
§ 1983 actions).
128. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2762
(1987); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1985); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966).
129. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 977 (2d Cir.
1987); Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1986); Testa v. Gallagher, 621 F. Supp.
476, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Bernard v. Delivery Drivers, 587 F. Supp. 524, 525 (D. Colo.
1984); Berard v. General Motors Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1035, 1043 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 657
F.2d 261 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 987 (1981); see also Note, supra note 102,
at 347. But see Reed v. United Transp. Union, 828 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1987)
("plaintiff's claims, though they be akin to civil rights claims, cannot be divorced from
the federal labor policy favoring stable labor-management relations"), cert. granted, 56
U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1988) (No. 87-1031); Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers, 748 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1984) (although Title I contains
union members' bill of rights, "the purpose and operation of such rights cannot be divorced from general principles governing our federal labor policy").
130. See supra note 122.
131. See United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982); Finnegan v. Leu,
456 U.S. 431, 435 (1982).
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union members some of the freedoms granted to citizens of the United
States by virtue of the Constitution.' 32 Therefore, Title I was drafted to
delineate the rights of union members just as the rights of American citizens are defined in the Bill of Rights. 3 3 An action protecting union
members from deprivation of rights similar to those secured for United
States citizens by the Constitution 34 closely resembles an action protecting citizens of the United States from deprivation under color of state law
of any rights secured by the Constitution. 35 In fact, the legislative history of the LMRDA demonstrates that Congress viewed Title I's provisions primarily as addressing civil rights concerns-not labor issues.' 3 6
The Supreme Court has determined that civil rights violations are best
characterized as personal injury actions.' 37 Such a characterization is
132. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6472 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 1, at 1098
(statement of Sen. McClellan).
133. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6478 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 1, at 1104
(statement of Sen. McClellan). Compare 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1982) (providing union
members with rights to freedom of speech and assembly) and 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(5) (affording union members procedural safeguards of notice and a hearing before imposing
discipline) with U.S. Const. amend. I (guaranteeing free speech and right to assemble)
and U.S. Const. amend. V (guaranteeing right to due process of law). Congress, however,
did not intend the scope of Title I's provisions to be identical to that of the Bill of Rights'
protections. See, eg., 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(l) (subjecting guarantee of equal rights and
privileges to "reasonable rules and regulations in [labor] organization's constitution and
bylaws"); 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(2) (reserving "right of a labor organization to adopt and
enforce reasonable rules" regulating members' rights to speech and assembly); see also
United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982) (union rules under
§ 41 1(a)(2) need only be reasonable; they need not pass strict scrutiny tests applied in first
amendment context).
134. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6478 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 1, at 1105
(statement of Sen. McClellan) ("Such rights are basic. They ought to be basic to every
person, and they are, under the Constitution of the United States."); 105 Cong. Rec.
15530 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 1, at 1566 (statement of Rep. Griffili
quoting Sen. McClellan) (" 'There is no reason why a union man should be required to
leave the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States at the door
when he goes into a union meeting.' ").
135. See Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), § 1, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
136. See Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1986). The legislative history reveals
repeated references to Title I as a "bill of rights" similar to that in the federal constitution. See Doty, 784 F.2d at 7; see, eg., 105 Cong. Rec. 6472, 6479 (1959), reprintedin 2
NLRB, supra note 1, at 1098, 1106 (statements of Sen. McClellan); see also 105 Cong.
Rec. 6476 (1959), reprintedin 2 NLRB, supra note 1, at 1103 (statement of Sen. McClellan) ("inherent constitutional rights"); 105 Cong. Rec. 6480 (1959), reprintedin 2 NLRB,
supra note 1, at 1106 (statement of Sen. McClellan) (rights "which are basic, and which
every citizen of the country is entitled to"); 105 Cong. Rec. 6472 (1959), reprinted in 2
NLRB, supra note 1, at 1098 (statement of Sen. McClellan) (bill would bring to union
members some of the freedoms of the Constitution, "which incidentally does not make an
exception for union members").
137. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985). The Court found that the historical atrocities prompting Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1871 "plainly sounded
in tort." Id at 277. Moreover, the language of the fourteenth amendment indicates that
tort claims for personal injuries are more analogous to § 1983 actions than other types of
tort claims. Id ("no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law or be denied the equal protection of the laws"). In addition, a personal

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

appropriate for Title I claims as well because of the strong similarity
between Title I claims and civil rights violations.1 38 Hence, it is appropriate to borrow state personal injury limitations periods for Title I

actions. 139

injury characterization minimizes the risk that the selection of a state limitations period
would not fairly serve federal interests. Id. at 279. Because personal injury claims have
always constituted a large part of civil litigation in the state courts, it is unlikely that the
limitations period for such claims "ever was, or ever would be, fixed in a way that would
discriminate against federal claims." Id.
138. See, e.g., Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 977 (2d
Cir. 1987) (applying to Title I claims three-year New York period governing personal
injury actions which is applicable to federal civil rights claims); Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d
1, 11 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying to Title I claims Massachussetts' three-year tort statute of
limitations applicable to civil rights claim); Testa v. Gallagher, 621 F. Supp. 476, 479
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying New York's three-year personal injury statute of limitations);
Bernard v. Delivery Drivers, 587 F. Supp. 524, 525 (D. Colo. 1984) (applying to Title I
claims Colorado statute of limitations applicable to civil rights claim); Berard v. General
Motors Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1035, 1043 (D. Mass.) (applying to Title I claims Massachusetts' three-year tort statute of limitations governing civil rights action), aff'd, 657 F.2d
261 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
139. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38 (Supp. 1987) (two years); Alaska Stat. § 09.10.070 (1983)
(two years); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-542 (Supp. 1987) (two years); Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 16-56-105 (1987) (three years); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340 (West Supp. 1988) (one
year); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 (1974) (one year); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-584
(West Supp. 1987) (two years); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8119 (1975) (two years); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 95.11 (West Supp. 1987) (four years); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33 (1982) (two
years); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7 (1985) (two years); Idaho Code § 5-219 (1979) (two
years); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 13-202 (Supp. 1987) (two years); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-1-2-2(1) (Burns Supp. 1986) (two years); Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(2) (West Supp.
1987) (two years); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (1984) (two years); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 413.140 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) (one year); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492
(West Supp. 1987) (one year); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 752 (1980) (six years); Md.
Cts & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-101 (1984) (three years); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 260, § 2A
(Law. Co-op. 1980) (three years); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(8) (West 1987)
(three years); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.07(1) (West Supp. 1988) (two years); Miss. Code
Ann. § 15-1-35 (Supp. 1987) (one year); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 516.120 (Vernon 1952) (five
years); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204 (1987) (two years); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 (1985)
(four years); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11.190(4) (Michie Supp. 1987) (two years); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4 (Supp. 1987) (three years); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (West 1987)
(two years); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8 (1978) (three years); N.Y. Civ. Prae. L. & R.
214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (three years); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (1983) (three years);
N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16 (Supp. 1987) (six years); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.11
(Anderson Supp. 1986) (one year); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1988) (two
years); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110 (1985) (two years); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 5524 (Purdon
Supp. 1987) (two years); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14 (1985) (three years); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-3-530(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (six years); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 15-2-14
(1984) (three years); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a) (1980) (one year); Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986) (two years); Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(3)
(1987) (two years); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 512 (1973 & Supp. 1987) (three years); Va.
Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Supp. 1987) (two years); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.16.080 (1962)
(three years); W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(b) (1981) (two years); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 893.53
(West 1983) (six years); Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(c) (1977) (four years).
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CONCLUSION

In UAW v. Hoosier CardinalCorp.,'4 the Court laid down the general
rule of borrowing state limitations periods when a federal labor statute
provides none. In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,14 ' the Court modified this rule to allow for the borrowing of a federal statute of limitations when the application of federal law is more
appropriate than that of state law in view of underlying federal policies.
In the LMRDA Title I context, the rule of Hoosierapplies. A close state
law analogy to an LMRDA Title I action exists. The interests sought to
be fostered by a state legislature in enacting the limitations period applicable to a civil rights action closely resemble those at stake in a union
member's claim against his union for violation of his rights.
DelCostello's modification of the Hoosier rule is inapposite because application of state law is more appropriate than the use of section 10(b) of
the NLRA and is not inconsistent with federal policy. Section 10(b) provides an inappropriate limitations period because the interests balanced
by Congress in enacting section 10(b) differ from those involved in an
LMRDA Title I suit. Consequently, there is no reason under the
DelCostello framework to depart from state law. The traditional rule instructing courts to borrow analogous state law limitations periods applies
to LMRDA Title I actions.
Joseph L Calamari
140. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
141. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).

